Cryptography II

Question 1  **Diffie–Hellman key exchange**  
(15 min)
Recall that in a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, there are values $a$, $b$, $g$ and $p$. Alice computes $g^a \mod p$ and Bob computes $g^b \mod p$.

(a) Which of these values ($a$, $b$, $g$, and $p$) are publicly known and which must be kept private?

(b) Mallory can eavesdrop, intercept, and modify everything sent between Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob perform Diffie-Hellman to agree on a shared symmetric key $K$. After the exchange, Bob gets the feeling something went wrong and calls Alice. He compares his value of $K$ to Alice’s and realizes that they are different. Explain what Mallory has done.

(c) Alice and Bob want to prevent Mallory from tampering with their keys by attaching a hash to each message (ie. Alice sends $(g^a, H(g^a))$ and Bob sends $(g^b, H(g^b))$). Does this successfully stop Mallory?

(d) Alice and Bob want to prevent Mallory from tampering with their keys by using a MAC. Assume they hold a shared symmetric key $K$ and attach a MAC to each message (ie. Alice sends $(g^a, MAC_k(g^a))$ and Bob sends $(g^b, MAC_k(g^b))$). Does this successfully stop Mallory? Assume Mallory can observe multiple, unique key exchanges between Alice and Bob before attempting an attack.
Question 2  *Perfect Forward Secrecy*  

Alice (A) and Bob (B) want to communicate using some shared symmetric key encryption scheme. Consider the following key exchange protocols which can be used by A and B to agree upon a shared key, $K$.

**ElGamal-Based Key Exchange**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Message 1</th>
<th>$A \rightarrow B$:</th>
<th>${K}_{PK_B}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Message 2</td>
<td>$A \leftarrow B$:</td>
<td>${\text{secret1}}_K$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message 3</td>
<td>$A \rightarrow B$:</td>
<td>${\text{secret2}}_K$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Key exchanged

**Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange**

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<td>${\text{secret1}}_K$</td>
</tr>
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<td>$A \rightarrow B$:</td>
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Key exchanged  

$K = g^{ab} \pmod{p}$

Some additional details:

- $PK_B$ is Bob’s long-lived public key.
- $K$, the Diffie-Hellman exponents $a$ and $b$, and the messages themselves are destroyed once all messages are sent. That is, these values are not stored on Alice and Bob’s devices after they are done communicating.

Eavesdropper Eve records all communications between Alice and Bob, but is unable to decrypt them. At some point in the future, Eve is lucky and manages to compromise Bob’s computer.

(a) Is the confidentiality of Alice and Bob’s prior ElGamal-based communication in jeopardy?

(b) What about Alice and Bob’s Diffie-Hellman-based communication?
Question 3  *Confidentiality and integrity*

Alice and Bob want to communicate with confidentiality and integrity. They have:

- Symmetric encryption.
  - Encryption: $\text{Enc}(K, m)$.
  - Decryption: $\text{Dec}(K, c)$.
- Cryptographic hash function: $\text{Hash}(m)$.
- MAC: $\text{MAC}(K, m)$.
- Signature: $\text{Sign}_{sk}(m)$.

They share a symmetric key $K$ and know each other’s public key.

We assume these cryptographic tools do not interfere with each other when used in combination; i.e., we can safely use the same key for encryption and MAC.

Alice sends to Bob

1. $c = \text{Hash}(\text{Enc}(K, m))$
2. $c = c_1, c_2 : \text{where } c_1 = \text{Enc}(K, m) \text{ and } c_2 = \text{Hash}(\text{Enc}(K, m))$
3. $c = c_1, c_2 : \text{where } c_1 = \text{Enc}(K, m) \text{ and } c_2 = \text{MAC}(K, m)$
4. $c = c_1, c_2 : \text{where } c_1 = \text{Enc}(K, m) \text{ and } c_2 = \text{MAC}(K, \text{Enc}(K, m))$
5. $c = \text{Sign}_{sk}(\text{Enc}(K, m))$
6. $c = c_1, c_2 : \text{where } c_1 = \text{Enc}(K, m) \text{ and } c_2 = \text{Enc}(K, \text{Sign}_{sk}(m))$

(a) Which ones of them can Bob decrypt?

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6

(b) Consider an eavesdropper Eve, who can see the communication between Alice and Bob.

Which schemes, of those decryptable in (a), also provide *confidentiality* against Eve?

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
(c) Consider a man-in-the-middle Mallory, who can eavesdrop and modify the communication between Alice and Bob.

Which schemes, of those decryptable in (a), provide integrity against Mallory? *i.e.*, Bob can detect any tampering with the message?

\[ \square 1 \quad \square 2 \quad \square 3 \quad \square 4 \quad \square 5 \quad \square 6 \]

(d) Many of the schemes above are insecure against a *replay attack*.

If Alice and Bob use these schemes to send many messages, and Mallory remembers an encrypted message that Alice sent to Bob, some time later, Mallory can send the exact same encrypted message to Bob, and Bob will believe that Alice sent the message *again*.

How to modify those schemes with confidentiality & integrity to prevent replay attack?

\[ \diamond \text{The first scheme providing confidentiality & integrity is Scheme } \square. \]

The modification is:

\[ \diamond \text{The second scheme providing confidentiality & integrity is Scheme } \square. \]

The modification is: